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DILEMMAS OF REPRESENTATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND
SEMI-CITIZENSHIP

ELIZABETH F. COHEN*
ABSTRACT
This Article takes up the question of “who counts?” with a three-part
argument. The first part of the argument makes the case that citizenship in
liberal democracies is subject to stresses caused by internal doctrinal conflict
that result in the creation of semi-citizenship statuses that offer some
individuals partial bundles of rights and semi-citizen statuses. Semi-citizenship
is inevitable. The second part of the argument looks closely at how this affects
the distribution of the political rights of citizenship: voting and representation.
I make the argument that we ought not conflate voting and representation.
Each is a distinct political right. People who cannot vote or do not vote are not
necessarily entirely unrepresented. This is particularly evident if one takes
seriously the trustee model of representation. The third part of the Article
compares three different cases of semi-citizenship in which groups who are
counted for the purposes of the census and legislative apportionment are not
accorded the vote. I examine the cases of children, non-citizens, and felons,
briefly illustrating how and why trusteeship serves the first two groups and
fails the third. These conclusions bolster the case for treating trusteeship as a
necessary component of a liberal democratic state and for treating it skeptically
in circumstances in which the trusteeship is not clearly linked to the political
capabilities of the population in question.

* Associate Professor of Political Science, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at
Syracuse University.
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INTRODUCTION
To count and be counted is a fundamental task of liberal democratic states
and their citizenries. Counting is shorthand for multifaceted dilemmas of
representation. These dilemmas include the challenges of how states document
and represent their populations, how individuals represent their own identities
to the public, and how citizens’ interests are represented in the process of
democratic decision-making. When we ask who counts in a liberal democratic
state, we are really asking who should be represented, how they should be
represented, and are they represented in that way. Asking who does or does not
count therefore raises overarching questions about the relationship of
representation to the bona fides of any democracy. In this Article I respond to
the challenge of asking who counts by examining the relationship between
citizenship theory and representation. I make a two-pronged argument in which
I first assert that all rights of citizenship, including representation, are accorded
to people in differentiated bundles rather than being distributed to each
member of the population in identical fashion. These bundles of differentiated
rights in turn create semi-citizenships—political statuses that depart from full
citizenship in any nation-state. We would, therefore, expect that every liberal
democratic state will produce a set of possible routes for representation rather
than one single unitary means for representing citizens’ interests. Members of
the population of any given nation-state will be represented using some or all
parts of an arsenal of representation techniques. The second prong of the
argument compares delegate and trustee style representation and pushes back
against the assumption that representation is a unitary process whose only
legitimate form is trusteeship.
I. SEMI-CITIZENSHIP
We ask whether someone counts in politics because representation is
among the fundamental rights that, as a complete bundle, compose liberal
democratic citizenship. Calling the representativeness of a polity into question
is tantamount to calling it undemocratic. But because both citizenship and
representation come in many shapes and sizes, we need to be able to define
each and understand their relationship to each other. As I have described
elsewhere,1 democratic citizenship is a political status that is gradient rather
than binary. This means that rather than dividing a population into citizens and
non-citizens, we accept the fact that citizenship exists on a continuum. People
do not hold one uniform public status. Rather, semi-citizenships abound,
offering slightly differentiated bundles of rights to various subsets of the
population. Full citizenship is defined as the possession of all fundamental
social, civil, and political rights along with legal nationality (the right to reside

1. ELIZABETH F. COHEN, SEMI-CITIZENSHIP IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2009).
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and move freely in a country). But many people carry different versions of a
basic rights bundle. People may possess some but not all of those fundamental
rights. They may be missing an entire category of rights (for example, stateless
persons have no legal nationality2) or they may have a weak version of one or
more categories of rights (for example, newly arrived legal immigrants and
temporary guests in the United States have only some social welfare rights
associated with full citizenship3). Like any democratic right, representation can
be parceled out in different degrees and forms. Any discussion of “who
counts” will necessitate an inquiry into what it means to be represented, what
are the range of acceptable forms and degrees of representation, whether
everyone who ought to be represented is actually represented, and whether
these differentiations of representation are justifiable.
II. THE ORIGINS OF SEMI-CITIZENSHIP
To fully respond to these questions we must first understand the root
explanation for the slicing up of citizenship’s component rights into semicitizenships. In the United States and its peer nations, a liberal democratic state
is responsible for defining and ensuring citizenship. The liberal democratic
state marries three distinct logics or doctrines of membership: that of the state
(administrative rationality and governmentality), that of liberalism (neutral
egalitarian inclusiveness), and that of the demos (situated ethics). These logics
of membership overlap at some points and conflict at others. It is the points of
conflict and attempts to forge compromises in the context of doctrinal conflict
that produce semi-citizenships, including, but not limited to, semi-citizenships
in which some semi-citizens are not represented on the same terms as other
semi-citizens and full citizens. Below I briefly introduce the three doctrines of
membership.
States are subject to the demands of an administrative rationality that will
constrain and contort the identities that individuals might choose in the absence
of things like census boxes and human resources affirmative action
questionnaires. In his Childress Lecture essay, “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?”,
Professor Levinson cites the work of James Scott and Melissa Nobles as
supporting the idea that the state is highly invested in counting and
categorizing its population.4 At root, their insights represent Foucauldian views
of the state. Foucault treats the state as an extension of what he terms

2. Id. at 146–47.
3. Jennifer B. Kinney & Elizabeth F. Cohen, Multilevel Citizenship in a Federal State: The
Case of Noncitizens’ Rights in the United States, in MULTILEVEL CITIZENSHIP 70, 72–76 (Willem
Maas ed., 2013).
4. Sanford Levinson, “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?”, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 937, 978–979
(2014).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1050

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1047

“governmental” logic. He defines governmentality, using three related criteria,
as:
1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and
reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very
specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its
principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical
means apparatuses of security.
2. . . . [T]he pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.)
of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting on the one
hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses,
and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savoirs.
3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of
justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the
5
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes “governmentalized.”

Governmentality brings scientific rationality to politics, creating a political
rationality whose stated end is to secure and improve the circumstances of the
population being governed. True to Foucauldian form, governmentality
addresses itself to questions of how politics can be conducted to ensure public
health, security, and stable power arrangements, among many things. As such,
governmentality and states that realize governmental logic will administer
citizenship rights with an eye to the security of the population rather than any
particular normative philosophy, including, but not limited to, liberal or
democratic theory.
All liberal democracies find their attempts to count and rationally
categorize populations tempered by the strong commitment of their citizens to
specific forms of government and ideologies, namely liberalism and
democratic theory. In the case of the United States, this means that
administrative rationality, liberal norms, and democratic norms are all
competing with one another over the terrain of citizenship rights. Liberalism
and democratic theory each stand in contrast to governmentality insofar as they
are normative doctrines. Liberalism prioritizes egalitarian inclusiveness.6 It is
predicated on the intrinsic equality of all persons. Liberalism confers rights on
5. Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN
GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 102–103 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991). Foucault’s most extensive
elaboration of the ideas of population and governmentality is contained in lectures he gave at the
Collège de France. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE
COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 1977–1978 (Michel Senellart et al. eds., Graham Burchell trans., Palgrave
Macmillan 2007) (2004) [hereinafter LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE]. See especially
Lecture of Jan. 11, 1978, in LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, supra, at 1; Lecture of Jan.
18, 1978, in LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, supra, at 29; Lecture of Jan. 25, 1978, in
LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, supra, at 55.
6. Jeremy Waldron, Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
THEORY 89, 89 (Gerald F. Gaus & Chandran Kukathas eds., 2004).
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all autonomous individuals. Several influential contemporary critiques of the
liberal state also assert that liberalism privileges the unitary insofar as it
prioritizes equality, and hence they oppose ostensibly unitary political status
with more diverse social identities.7 Charles Taylor emphasizes the way in
which liberalism leaves people homogenous.8 Iris Young’s theory of
differentiated citizenship makes a related, but potentially more systemizing,
effort to suggest that liberal impartiality operates on three dimensions.9 It
“denies the particularity of situations”; “master[s] or eliminate[s]
heterogeneity”; and “reduc[es] the plurality of moral subjects to one
subjectivity.”10 Young argues that the liberal state papers over inequalities
generated via the oppression of identity groups. It does this by falsely asserting
that the act of abstracting diverse individuals into citizens transforms their
diversity into an identical public entity: the citizen. “[T]he ideal of impartiality
in moral theory expresses a logic of identity that seeks to reduce differences to
unity. The stances of detachment and dispassion that supposedly produce
impartiality are attained only by abstracting from the particularities of
situation, feeling, affiliation, and point of view.”11 Liberalism on its own does
not seem to provide a basis for boundaries or distinguishing among differently
entitled subjects.
In contrast, democratic norms are reliant on situated principles.12 By its
very nature, a demos must discriminate. It must develop a rule stating who is
and is not included in the demos and then turn over enforcement of that rule to
the state. Democratic rules about who receives the rights of citizenship will
refer to the situated ethics produced by the people, traditions, and belief
systems that compose a society.13 This stands in stark contrast to liberalism’s
inclusive egalitarianism and administrative rationality’s focus on security and
efficiency. Robert Dahl describes the opposition between liberal egalitarian
citizenship norms and democratic inclinations to draw situated boundaries
using the categorical and contingent principles.14 The categorical principle
states: “Every person subject to a government and its laws has an unqualified
right to be a member of the demos (i.e., a citizen).”15 Robert Goodin has
promoted a similar principle under the name of including “all affected

7. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 97 (1990).
8. Charles Taylor, Hegel: History, and Politics, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS, 177, 193
(Michael J. Sandel ed., New York Univ. Press 1984) (1975).
9. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 100–01.
10. Id. at 100.
11. Id. at 97.
12. COHEN, supra note 1, at 100–02.
13. Id.
14. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 120, 122 (1989).
15. Id. at 124.
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interests.”16 The contingent principle states that “[o]nly persons who are
qualified to govern, but all such persons, should be members of the demos (i.e.,
citizens).”17 To resolve this conflict of values, Dahl tests the validity of a
“modified categorical principle” that states that “[e]very adult subject to a
government and its law must be presumed to be qualified as, and has an
unqualified right to be, a member of the demos.”18 Dahl resolves that inclusion
must be based upon the following criterion: “The demos must include all adult
members of the association except transients and persons proved to be
mentally defective.”19 He therefore flags maturity, capability, and a temporal
relationship to the space associated with a given demos as the most significant
indicators of citizenship.
Dahl’s theory seems to raise more questions than it answers and offers a
reminder of the problems inherent in defining the boundaries of a gradient
category such as citizenship. Indeed, the modified categorical principle of
membership invites disputes related to boundary and threshold. How do we
define fitness for citizenship? What is the line between adulthood and
childhood? When does someone make the transition from being a foreigner to
being a subject of the laws, and therefore to being a citizen? The contingent
principle and its particularity carries with it the potential for myriad forms of
partiality, both intended and unintended. Even its use to modify a categorical
norm will impose some situated ethics on an otherwise liberal framework for
citizenship. In so doing, the rights of citizenship will be subdivided, creating
semi-citizenships.
Doctrinal competition is the reason that in any liberal democratic state
there will not be one single version of a perfectly whole citizenship. Instead,
there are many different semi-citizenships. The idea that there would be one
single citizenship starts to seem very unlikely when one considers that not only
are we trying to fit a whole bunch of very differently situated people into that
mold, but the ideologies that go into defining the citizenship are in constant
negotiations over who will have privacy and when, what “counts” as free
speech, and when is the exact moment that a child or a foreign-born person
becomes a citizen. All of the fundamental rights of citizenship can be sliced
into constituent parts to create semi-citizenships.
The three-way doctrinal competition between administrative rationality,
liberalism, and democratic situated ethics is of great consequence for how
political rights, and particularly representation, will be defined and accorded in
any liberal democratic state. Administrative rationality will emphasize

16. Robert E. Goodin, Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives, 35 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 40, 48–51 (2007).
17. DAHL, supra note 14, at 124.
18. Id. at 127.
19. Id. at 129.
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efficiency—in this view, representation only matters insofar as it relates to
national security threats, contagion, or economic functioning. Liberalism seeks
to be fair, egalitarian, and inclusive. Of the three doctrines, liberalism has the
least interest in a complex system of representation. In fact, for the purposes of
liberalism, it would be best if we were not invested in complex pictures of
ourselves that call on various forms of difference. Better if we are all equally
situated rational choosers interested in maximizing our liberty and selfinterest.20 Religion, race, gender, and so on just muddy things, particularly
when they intersect with each other.21 Inclusiveness is easiest when we can
make a rule that all people are equal and equally entitled. Finally, democracy
seeks us to follow our hearts and minds. Democracies need to know a lot about
our identities. And because the demos is going to make decisions about the
worth and standing of various facets of identity, it is also going to pose
challenges to liberalism and the state, both of which I have described as fairly
uninterested in the nuances of identity. As it turns out, our hearts and minds are
neither efficient, like states, nor fair and inclusive like liberalism. Quite the
contrary, as Professor Levinson shows us.22 Demoi exhibit myriad prejudices
and forms of partiality. In turn, such prejudices and partiality create
representation rules that directly contradict the mandates of administrative
rationality and liberalism.
III. REPRESENTATION
Semi-citizenships are the product of doctrinal conflict in liberal democratic
states, and they take the form of memberships that offer people some but not
all of the rights of citizenship. The rights of citizenship are generally
recognized as falling into one of four categories. T.H. Marshall’s widely cited
definition of citizenship includes social rights, civil rights, and political
rights.23 To this I would add rights to place and free movement.24 These rights
are the essential elements of the democratic bundle that defines citizenship.25
Representation is classified as a political right.26 “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?”
takes up the question of semi-citizenship as it pertains to the many facets of
political rights and representation. The examples Professor Levinson
introduces show the hallmark traits of doctrinal conflict and compromise. At
20. A Kantian or Rawlsian system of representation would comport with this
characterization of liberalism. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971).
21. DARA Z. STROLOVITCH, AFFIRMATIVE ADVOCACY: RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 46–48 (2007).
22. Levinson, supra note 4, at 945–46, 970–71.
23. T.H. MARSHALL, Citizenship and Social Class, in CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT 78 (1964).
24. COHEN, supra note 1, at 17, 145.
25. Id. at 6.
26. See MARSHALL, supra note 23; DAHL, supra note 14, at 28–30.
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the heart of Levinson’s essay is dismay about the fact that there are large
numbers of persons in the United States who are counted in the census and
included in apportionment figures that determine the number of Congressional
seats a state will have but who cannot vote.27 Let me restate this quandary in
the terms of doctrinal conflict. The state, acting on governmental logic, is
compelled to count every last person it can identify within its borders. This
means that the census includes undocumented persons, resident aliens, and
imprisoned felons, in addition to the modal full citizen population. By contrast,
the demos has made rules for enfranchising people that generally exclude
people without legal nationality and people who are incarcerated, among
others.28 This is not a problem for the purposes of administrative rationality,
but it does violate liberal egalitarian norms that cannot justify exclusionary
representation practices. Egalitarianism and ethical democracy dictate different
answers about whether all persons subject to the law of the land ought to have
a say in the making of those laws. This is a clear example of Dahl’s categorical
and contingent principles at play.
Districting rules, another example raised in “Who Counts?” “Sez
Who?”,29 are caught in a three-way tug of war between efficiency, fairness,
and a historically exclusionary demos. Bureaucratically rational districts that
maximize the efficient administration of territorial subunits are frequently
altered by gerrymandering.30 Gerrymandering, in turn, is imposed at times to
improve the chances that minorities will receive adequate representation and at
other times to accomplish the exact opposite.31 In the former case
gerrymandering is being used to improve the chances that representation will
be accomplished in an egalitarian fashion. In the latter instance
gerrymandering is being used to express the will of an inegalitarian demos. A
third example of doctrinal conflict that results in a dilemma for representation
rights crystallizes around voter identification. Identity papers begin as a means
27. Levinson, supra note 4, at 947–57.
28. On the franchise rights of non-citizens, see RON HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL:
RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2006); Jamin B. Raskin,
Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien
Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1392–93 (1993). Most felons and many ex-felons are also
presently disenfranchised. On felon disenfranchisement, see JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER
UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 7–8 (2006);
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws Across the United States,
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_48642.pdf (last visited
Jan. 2, 2014).
29. Levison, supra note 4, at 954–55.
30. On the idea of a rational district and frequent gerrymandering of U.S. electoral districts,
see Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Reapportionment Gerrymanders and the Notion of “Compactness”,
50 MINN. L. REV. 443, 443–44 (1966). On the reasons for gerrymandering, see Samuel
Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 595, 598 (2002).
31. Issacharoff, supra note 30, at 597, 602–03.
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for the state to document and monitor its population.32 For the purposes of
liberalism, however, they come to stand in for a uniform public status. A
passport or a Social Security card is evidence of one’s political standing in the
eyes of the state. Yet at times the selective privileging of forms of
identification to which subsets of the population have limited access has also
been a means through which various forms of discrimination could be
imposed. It is no wonder that in 2013 we find ourselves in an intense national
wrangle about whether student IDs or gun licenses are valid ways of letting the
government discern who among us is an eligible voter.33 And it is equally
unsurprising that our voter identification compromises have created groups of
semi-citizens whose opportunity to vote is now in doubt.
These and other quandaries about who is represented in politics are
essentially questions about who is accorded which kind of semi-citizenship and
for what reasons. Any measure of how fully someone is accorded citizenship
must take into account the degree to which that person is represented in
politics. To assess the degree to which someone is represented is to assess the
degree to which their views and interests “count” in the terms of democratic
politics. This assessment requires an understanding of what constitutes
representation. Representation itself is an essentially contested concept.34 As
Hanna Pitkin’s seminal text on representation states, it “presupposes at least a
rudimentary conception of what representation (or power, or interest) is, what
counts as representation, where it leaves off and some other phenomenon
begins.”35 Pitkin details the modern nature of representation in contrast to
ancient ideas that more literally took representation to mean the re-presentation
of something absent, such as an abstract object like a book or a face depicted in
a work of art.36 Representation only came to be applied to people, and in the
context of politics, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.37
Once representation was incorporated into early and high modern political
theory, its meanings proliferated. From Hobbes’ capacious understanding of
almost any government as being representative,38 to Rousseau’s narrow view

32. CRAIG ROBERTSON, THE PASSPORT IN AMERICA: THE HISTORY OF A DOCUMENT 4–7
(2010); JOHN TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP AND
THE STATE 14–15 (2000).
33. Veronica Harwin, A Tale of Two States: Challenges to Voter ID Ballot Measures in
Missouri and Minnesota, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 203, 205–11 (2013).
34. W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN
SOCIETY 167, 169 (1955–56).
35. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 1–2 (1967).
36. Id. at 2–3.
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id. at 30.
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that representation could only be enacted directly,39 norms defining what it
means to “count” in politics abound. Each political system will generate its
own version of representation. In contrast to something like a right to free
movement, representation can only be fully understood in context. In Charles
Tilly’s terms, we call representation a relative right.40 Relative rights are
defined contextually, relative to the political system that generates them. That
means that we can only understand representation in the context of the society
and ethical system in which politics is being conducted. What constitutes
representation will vary from one political system to another. For example,
proportional representation is predicated on the idea that representation of a
demos with a diverse set of political views requires a similarly diverse set of
representatives.41 By contrast, a winner-take-all system generally produces a
relatively small number of political parties with a less diverse set of platforms
and candidates.42 What it means to “count”—to be represented on par with
one’s fellow citizens—will depend on very different outcomes in proportional
and winner-take-all systems.
The relative nature of representation is critical because it will confine any
normative claims we wish to make about whether people are or are not
properly represented in any given political system. Representation is best
judged from within the political system because it is nearly impossible to
specify a single ideal formula for representation. We are better off not making
the claim that someone’s citizenship in the United States is degraded simply
because they are not represented in the terms that a German citizen would be.43
We might ask instead whether that U.S. citizen is represented in the manner
promised by the U.S. political system. Is that person represented on the same
terms as all other U.S. citizens?
The answer, according to Levinson, is that many people in the United
States are not fully and equally represented in the manner promised by the U.S.

39. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 102 (Rogers D. Masters ed.,
Judith R. Masters trans., 1978) (1762).
40. Relative rights are distinguished from autonomous rights. Autonomous rights do not
depend on context for interpretation. So, for example, the autonomous right to free exercise will
not mean something different in different regimes. CHARLES TILLY, DURABLE INEQUALITY 25–
26 (1998).
41. André Blais, Agnieszka Dobrzynska & Indridi H. Indridason, To Adopt or Not to Adopt
Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice, 35 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 182, 183
(2005).
42. Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed
Systems, 18 INT’L. POL. SCI. REV. 297, 301 (1997).
43. An exception is the interrogation of representation lodged by Robert Dahl in ROBERT A.
DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2d ed. 2003), and a separate
discussion of our legislative process in SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2006). I will take up these concerns later in this Article. See infra notes 61–70.
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political system and on the same terms as their fellow citizens.44 He points to a
powerful set of examples illustrating precipitous disparities of representation
within the U.S. population.45 As noted earlier,46 undocumented immigrants,
unnaturalized persons, felons, and an array of other groups of persons cannot
vote even though all of them are counted for the purposes of the census and
congressional apportionment. Each of these groups is also taxed and subject to
the law of the land and each is eligible for some, if meager, social and civil
rights.47 These groups are semi-citizens who cannot vote and whom Levinson
therefore claims are also denied the political right to representation.48
“Who Counts?” “Sez Who?” rightly expresses that public officials view
the job of representation to be responding to, and even mirroring, the stated
preferences of their constituents.49 This is an accurate reflection of what many
elected officials report and what many, if not most, of their constituents also
report.50 But democratic theorists have produced a very rich and important
second tradition of representation. This second tradition regards elected
officials as the guardians of the best interests of the public.51 Edmund Burke
makes the distinction into one between preferences and interests.52 Delegates
are bound to represent the preferences of voters.53 Trustees are bound to
represent the interests of the voters.54 When voters’ stated preferences diverge
from an assessment of their interests, the delegate cannot justifiably act on
knowledge of those interests and a trustee should not be swayed by any
statement of preferences.55 For Burke, representatives are obligated to be the
ultimate source of judgment about the best interests of a demos.56
There are various names for the two traditions. In deference to the common
parlance of political theory, I will call them the delegate and the trustee models
of representation. The essay “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?” speaks primarily of

44. Levinson, supra note 4 at 947–57.
45. Id.
46. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
47. For a discussion of how to think about the relative depth of rights available to these and
other semi-citizen groups, see COHEN, supra note 1, at 72–73.
48. Levinson, supra note 4, at 947–57.
49. Id. at 949.
50. Id. at 949–50.
51. Andrew Rehfeld, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in
the Study of Political Representation and Democracy, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 214, 214–15
(2009).
52. See EDMUND BURKE, A Letter to Sir H. Langrishe, Bart., M.P., in V THE WORKS OF
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 157, 200 (1907).
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. PITKIN, supra note 35, at 55.
56. NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT: PRINCIPLES AND GENEALOGY 89
(2008).
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the delegate model of representation and tacitly defends this model of
representation. It is important, however, not to dismiss trusteeship. Trusteeship
shares important normative premises with other pillars of the U.S. political
system. It is also empirically virtually impossible not to incorporate elements
of trusteeship into a legal rational government. Nadia Urbinati astutely notes
that Rousseau’s body of work, taken as a whole, does not reject representation
(as so many people assume after reading The Social Contract) so much as he
sees delegation as a form of trusteeship that is distinct from the act of
representing one’s own views in a deliberation and decision-making process.57
Decision-making should be done by citizens, but other kinds of legislation
might be better effected by representatives. We must not convince ourselves,
however, that delegation is somehow a more authentic form of representation
than trusteeship. Delegates are interpreters of interests just as are trustees.
IV. THE PLACE OF TRUSTEESHIP IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
The normative defenses of trusteeship are not only plausible, they are
integral to the theories of representation that shaped the American political
system. Controversial norms aside, trusteeship is inextricably woven into the
fabric of U.S. politics. Elsewhere, Levinson points out that the Philadelphia
Convention saw open advocacy of including an element of trusteeship in the
construction of the U.S. legislature.58 As political theorist Bryan Garsten has
noted: “Counterintuitive as it sounds, a fundamental purpose of representative
government, as Constant and Madison saw it, is to oppose popular sovereignty
in the sense that it is usually understood . . . .”59 Madison departed from the
Burkean tradition of elitist trusteeship, but he still saw representation as
primarily an act of independent interpretation rather than simply the relaying of
an expressed preference.60 It was the intent of some influential founders to
create a set of buffers between the mass of constituents and policy outcomes by
treating the vote and representation as distinct entities. What the founders
created is in exact accord with what we would expect doctrinal conflict to
produce. The bargain our founders struck was a system of representation that
sliced up the right to representation and gave us only partial access to delegate
representation, reserving some of the power of the state for trusteeship.
To some this warrants calling U.S. democracy undemocratic. Political
scientists Robert Dahl and Sanford Levinson have both written books decrying
the U.S. constitutional structure for this very reason.61 More recently and more

57. Id. at 62.
58. LEVINSON, supra note 43, at 32.
59. Bryan Garsten, Representative Government and Popular Sovereignty, in POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION 90, 91 (Ian Shapiro et al. eds., 2009).
60. Rehfeld, supra note 51, at 223–24.
61. DAHL, supra note 43; LEVINSON, supra note 43.
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publically, the radical left publication Jacobin, reported in an article called
“Tea Party Yankees”:
The average member of the House “Suicide Caucus” (half of which is
southern, compared to 30% of the overall House) won his or her last election
by a margin of 32 percentage points. Nationwide the average House member
won by a 31 point margin. For the average Republican winner the margin was
29%. By comparison, in the last UK election the average parliamentary victor
won with a total vote of 47%.
But the problem runs deeper than the mere mechanics of elections. When
voters do bother to vote, even on the rare occasions their vote matters, the
results are rendered opaque and irrelevant—a proliferation of veto points, a
miasma of dispersed authority—by a constitutional structure meticulously
designed to suppress any visible connection between the casting of a ballot and
62
the enactment of a program.

The verdict—that our Constitution is “not very democratic”—was a foregone
conclusion if one rejects the idea that there is a place for trusteeship in any
liberal democratic state.
Robert Dahl, Sanford Levinson, and Jacobin are three very different voices
articulating surprise and disapproval that representation is so buffered by
trusteeship in the United States. However, trusteeship cannot and should not be
rejected out of hand. In fact, the legitimacy of our democracy is reliant on
trusteeship. I say this because there is so much evidence of these two
phenomena: on the one hand, disaffected constituents who decry the quality of
their delegate representation and contribute to the incredibly low popularity of
our representative institutions in this country;63 and on the other hand,
evidence of Congress and other public officials acting very much as trustees of
people who do not and may never vote.64 If we were to predicate the
legitimacy of our democracy solely on the quality of delegate style
representation, we would be setting an impossibly high bar for democracy. As
I will show, it would be far less democratic to abandon trusteeship entirely and
insist on only legitimizing delegate representation. A great deal of democratic

62. Seth Ackerman, Tea Party Yankees, JACOBIN, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2013/10/
tea-party-yankees/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
63. For a recent sampling of public opinion polling on Congress, see Congressional Job
Approval, REALCLEARPOLITICS.COM, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/congressio
nal_job_approval-903.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
64. In the 2010 midterm (i.e., non-presidential) election, only approximately 40% of eligible
voters turned out. See 2010 General Election Turnout Rates, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://elec
tions.gmu.edu/Turnout_2010G.html (last updated Feb. 4, 2012). While rates tend to be higher
during presidential election years, this has less relevance for the question of whether people
actually vote for their representatives. See 2012 General Election Turnout Rates, U.S. ELECTIONS
PROJECT, http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2012G.html (last updated July 22, 2013).
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deliberation and inclusion would grind to a halt if we were to think this way
about representation.
Thinking about the best interests of the public and considering
representation to be trusteeship transforms the terms of any discussion about
who counts in politics in two crucial ways. First, trusteeship does not prioritize
the stated preferences of constituents over other information regarding their
welfare that may be available. A representative may weigh a person’s stated
preferences against an understanding of their interests. This is actually
necessary even when the representative considers himself to be a delegate. For
example, people protesting with signs that say “Keep your government hands
off my Medicare” are sending their representatives an illegible message.65 The
representative must interpret whether that protestor is more committed to small
government or more committed to Medicare. Representation is always an act
of interpretation, as noted by Pitkin and as discussed earlier in this Article.66
We might say that trustees fail at this some of the time, leaving their nonvoting constituents unrepresented, but then we would also say that they fail to
represent many voters’ interests as well.
A second change enforced by considering trusteeship to be an important
form of representation is that under trusteeship our constituency is not
considered to be solely a collection of individuals. Trusteeship recognizes
individual voters to be parts of constituencies defined not simply by electoral
math but by interests. Ultimately, to a trustee, voters compose one single
demos, whose collective relationships, histories, and other characteristics and
outcomes outweigh the importance of any single individual’s interests. An
individual is almost a fiction in this view because we cannot understand much
about someone’s needs and interests outside of their social context, which
inevitably requires understanding their group memberships. Thus, a trustee
never represents a set of individuals. A trustee always represents a group of
people. While delegates are also ultimately working on behalf of groups, the
information they receive necessarily takes the form of aggregated expressions
of preferences. Using other information treats an entire society rather than
segmenting the society into distinct demographics. Trustees are trustees of
social groups as well as individuals. Those social groups will include nonvoters. The trustee’s job is to use that information to protect and further the
well-being of her constituents, either as individuals, as members of groups, or
both.

65. This was a refrain that went viral prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act. Bob
Cesca, Keep Your Goddamn Government Hands Off My Medicare!, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5,
2009, 6:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-cesca/get-your-goddamn-governme_b_252
326.html.
66. See supra notes 35–38, 55 and accompanying text.
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V. HOW DO WE KNOW WE EXPECT OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO BE TRUSTEES?
There are myriad arguments to be made about the relative costs and
benefits of trusteeship versus delegate models of representations. The Burkean
and Madisonian traditions of trusteeship representation make normative
arguments in favor of trusteeship for predictable reasons, and scholars such as
Dahl and Levinson fire back with legitimate concerns about paternalism and
outright exclusion. At this point, I would like to turn the conversation away
from normative evaluation and examine how representation actually occurs.
In any representative system, but particularly in two-party systems, it is
expected that electoral contestation will result in a winner or set of winners and
a set of people whose preferred candidate is not elected. As a matter of course,
it is also true that constituents who vote for a candidate or even a party that
loses are not considered either disenfranchised or unrepresented just because
they did not get their way. Robert Dahl’s scathing indictment of the U.S.
Constitution as undemocratic considers how the Senate unfairly privileges
residents of sparsely populated states, giving them “more” representation per
citizen than the residents of populous states receive.67 He and Levinson also
critique “first-past-the-post” electoral systems for their tendency to produce
only two political parties, which marginalize or entirely eradicate smaller
parties and the minority views they represent.68 What Dahl does not say is that
people who vote for losing candidates should be considered fully
disenfranchised or unrepresented. Voting for losing candidates is considered an
inevitable part of democratic politics and representative government.
In any system of indirect representation we accept that some of the time we
can and must be represented by someone for whom we did not vote. We also
know that we will be represented by someone who was elected by people with
points of view that depart from our own. Any kind of representative
government depends on citizens’ acceptance of departures from their expressed
preferences. If any indirect representative system is predicated on the idea that
people can and will be represented by elected officials for whom they did not
vote, we cannot dismiss an electoral system such as that of the United States as
unrepresentative.
The expectation that we will be represented by people for whom we did
not vote or by people whose electoral majority expresses views that depart
from ours invalidates the idea that representatives simply express constituents
stated preferences. Recognizing trusteeship as legitimate and unavoidable is a
crucial point in the discussion of representation because, once we accept that
representation is not always the re-presentation of what we said we wanted, the
very idea of voting, or of having one’s vote “count,” takes on a new cast. If our

67. DAHL, supra note 43, at 48–50.
68. Id. at 57; LEVINSON, supra note 43, at 91.
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representatives are trustees, then we will loosen the expectation that there must
be a direct correlation between how we vote and what an elected official does.
Instead of a sharp demarcation between representation and its opposite, we see
a spectrum of representations that are offered to the population.
Recall that in the first half of this Article I argued that each of the core
elements of citizenship exists not in a binary relationship to the absence of that
right, but rather as a continuum.69 Levinson and Dahl see the continuum of
representation as marked on one end by direct and participatory democracy and
on the other end by trusteeship. This slips easily into a treatment of voting as
an instance of representation and as possibly the only truly democratic instance
of representation. We move quickly to the point at which we have actually
conflated voting and representation rather than treating them as distinct ends
unto themselves.
In fact, it would not appear that either Levinson or Dahl want to treat
voting as the only legitimate form of representation. If they were to make this
argument, any election that seats one party’s candidate automatically
diminishes the citizenship of the losing party’s supporters. Even systems of
proportional representation will frequently fail to seat a member of every
political party in an electoral contest. And any representative formula is a
recipe for diluting the political will of individual constituents. Having access to
the franchise is an important element of citizenship, but we cannot jump from
an argument about disenfranchisement directly to an argument about
representation. Instead of the direct representation/trusteeship continuum, we
might recognize voting and representation as having equal and integral
importance to one’s political citizenship. They are each their own continuum.
In this case we do not move along a sliding scale of democratic-ness that
begins with the vote and ends somewhere around trusteeship. Instead,
instances of representation can happen in the absence of enfranchisement just
as we expect that representation can still occur when the exercise of one’s
franchise rights does not result in one’s chosen candidate or party being
elected. This is a good thing for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact
that so few people vote in the United States, let alone vote in non-presidential
elections.
If we treat representation and enfranchisement as having equal significance
to any person’s political citizenship, the most important ongoing work a
member of the population can do is the work of making her identity and all of
her life circumstances visible in the public sphere. This is consistent with T.H.
Marshall’s description of civil rights of speech as integral to political rights of
representation and franchise.70

69. See supra Parts I–III.
70. MARSHALL, supra, note 23, at 65, 78.
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VI. TRUSTEESHIP AND DISENFRANCHISED GROUPS
Our implicit acceptance of trusteeship in any representative system opens
the way to ask questions about whether semi-citizens who are not enfranchised
are also not represented. Levinson mentions a wide array of groups who are
disenfranchised in contemporary American politics. He focuses particular
attention on ex-felons and non-citizens.71 To this list we might also add
children, who generally compose the largest disenfranchised group in any
democratic society.72 Relying for the moment on these notable instances of
antidemocratic representation, we can interrogate whether the absence of the
political right to vote automatically leads to a breakdown of representation.
Felons (and sometimes ex-felons), non-citizens, and children are all classes of
persons that are disenfranchised. To what extent do we also believe that each
of these groups is also unrepresented?
A.

Children’s Semi-Citizenship and Representation

Political theorists considering the idea of childhood have advocated for
considering the state to be the fiduciary of children’s basic interests while
parents are treated as fiduciaries of children’s best interests.73 Fiduciaries in
this context “act[] on behalf of someone else, usually because of that person’s
temporary or permanent incapacity. Fiduciaries do not pursue their own
interests; indeed, to do so would generally be seen as an abuse of the fiduciary
role.”74 Fiduciaries embody the trusteeship model of representation. In the
basic interests/best interests formulation, the state is responsible for providing
children with a basic social safety net. To the extent that this requires
representation, various government agencies at the federal and state levels are
responsible for recognizing children as persons, bringing children’s interests
into the public sphere, and fulfilling the charge of ensuring their security and
physical well-being. This might mean ensuring a free and high-quality public
education, or it might require funding welfare programs that feed and shelter
poor families with children. Parents, in turn, are fiduciaries of children’s
interests in things like their religious upbringing, the transmission of personal
values, their connection to a community, and the development of their political

71. Levinson, supra note 4, at 950–51.
72. The United States Census estimates that 23.5% of the population is under the age of
eighteen. USA QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, http://quick
facts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last updated Jan. 7, 2014). By comparison, approximately
2.5% of the voting population is disenfranchised as a result of a felony conviction. James
Ridgeway & Jean Casella, Nearly 6 Million Americans Can’t Vote Due to Felon
Disenfranchisement Laws, MOTHER JONES, (July 13, 2012, 1:30 AM), http://www.motherjones.
com/mojo/2012/07/black-vote-felon-disenfranchisement-laws-florida.
73. IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 92, 96–97 (1999).
74. Id. at 70.
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views. The fiduciary model departs from the coverture model insofar as it
stipulates that the state is responsible for certain children’s interests regardless
of whether parents exercise their franchise on behalf of their children. It would
be beyond the scope of this discussion to thoroughly evaluate all the ways in
which the state does or does not fulfill its responsibilities to children. The
essential observation to make is that states regularly prove themselves capable
of discharging their duties to children as well as they discharge their duties to
most full citizens. Nor is it clear that enfranchising even children who are
developmentally quite similar to adults would result in a markedly different or
improved outcome. While it is important to recognize that children are not full
citizens, it would be impossible to fully enfranchise all children. Conflating
enfranchisement and representation obscures the ways in which trusteeship
functions to represent children.
B.

Non-Citizen Semi-Citizenship and Representation

Levinson raises questions about the disenfranchisement of non-citizens.75
Non-citizen disenfranchisement takes several forms. Undocumented persons,
various types of temporary residents including guest-workers and students,
refugees, and permanent residents all have different forms of semi-citizenship
and different citizenship trajectories. What they all have in common is that
they are counted by the census, and hence for the purposes of apportionment,
they are expected to obey laws including those that tax them, and they have
some civil and social rights associated with citizenship.76 Those civil and
social rights are quite robust in the case of permanent residents and quite
anemic in the case of undocumented persons and temporary workers.77 They
also share a common political fate: none may vote in federal elections and
almost nowhere in the United States can any of them vote in any election.78
Is the disenfranchisement of non-U.S. citizens tantamount to the absence
of any opportunities for the representation of non-citizens in U.S. politics?

75. Levinson, supra note 4, at 947–57.
76. Peter J. Spiro, The (Dwindling) Rights and Obligations of Citizenship, 21 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 899, 906 (2013).
77. On the degree to which permanent residents have close to full citizenship, see PETER J.
SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2008). On the weak
rights of guest-workers, see Etan Newman et al., No Way to Treat a Guest: Why the H-2A
Agricultural Visa Program Fails U.S. and Foreign Workers, FARMWORKER JUSTICE (2011),
available at http://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/files/documents/7.2.a.6%20No%20
Way%20To%20Treat%20A%20Guest%20H-2A%20Report.pdf.
78. On non-citizen voting, see RON HAYDUK, supra note 28; Raskin, supra note 28, at
1393–94. A very few highly localized exceptions to the non-voting rule do exist. See Aaron
Kraut, Takoma Park Stands by Non-U.S. Citizen Voting Law, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-14/local/35449488_1_takoma-park-noncitizens-votecampaign.
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There is evidence that non-citizen interests in fact do receive representation,
and that in their case trusteeship representation has and might again offer the
opportunity for a transition from trusteeship to both delegate style
representation and the forms of enfranchisement offered to full citizens.
Somebody is doing some work to represent the interests of undocumented
immigrants, one of the most fully and permanently disenfranchised groups to
whom “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?” refers. Otherwise they would not be
getting driver’s licenses in some states,79 being regularized by infrequent but
important amnesties,80 and receiving various other benefits.81 This is not to say
that their semi-citizenship constitutes a fully just arrangement. It is simply an
observation that representation occurs in the absence of the franchise.
The starkest evidence of this fact is the 1986 amnesty, which ultimately
transformed approximately three million undocumented and temporary
workers into permanent residents eligible to naturalize.82 If representation of
either the trusteeship or delegate can be said to accomplish anything, it ought
to accomplish large-scale change that expands the opportunities for political
participation of groups seeking those rights.
Their interests are not only being protected because businesses stand to
profit or because they have family members in this country, both of which
would constitute an indirect form of trusteeship. Governors, senators, and even
the President have also spoken on behalf of the interests of the
undocumented.83 They also are speaking on behalf of themselves in Congress,
as we saw when Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Jose Antonio Vargas testified

79. Esther Yu-Hsi Lee, In-State Tuition, Driver’s Licenses, And Other Immigrant-Friendly
Laws That Took Effect This Week, THINKPROGRESS, (Jan. 3, 2014, 4:13 PM), http://thinkpro
gress.org/immigration/2014/01/03/3114881/immigration-laws-january-1-2014/.
80. The Seven Amnesties Passed by Congress, NUMBERSUSA, https://www.numbersusa.
com/content/learn/illegal-immigration/seven-amnesties-passed-congress.html (last updated June
7, 2011).
81. Spiro, supra note 76.
82. Betsy Cooper & Kevin O’Neil, Lessons From the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 3 (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/re
search/lessons-immigration-reform-and-control-act-1986.
83. See Jenna Portnoy, Chris Christie Trumpets Signing of Dream Act in Union City, STARLEDGER (Jan 07, 2014, 9:10 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/01/chris_christie_
trumpets_signing_of_dream_act_in_union_city.html; Andy Bromage, Sanders and Welch Go to
Bat for Migrant Farmworker Facing Deportation; Leahy Still Noncommittal, SEVEN DAYS: VT’S
INDEPENDENT VOICE (Jun. 18, 2013, 11:02 AM), http://www.sevendaysvt.com/OffMessage/ar
chives/2013/06/18/sanders-and-welch-go-to-bat-for-migrant-farmworker-facing-deportationleahy-still-noncommittal; President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration
Reform (Oct. 24, 2013), available at OFF. PRESS SEC’Y, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2013/10/24/remarks-president-immigration-reform.
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about Comprehensive Immigration Reform.84 One could hardly say that
disenfranchisement has denied non-citizens access to the public sphere or the
opportunity to influence public policy. If we take the premise of the first half
of this Article seriously, we presume that semi-citizenship is inevitable. Some
people will be disenfranchised in any liberal democratic state. The prevalence
of birthright citizenship laws makes it likely that non-citizens will also be
semi-citizens, disenfranchised either temporarily or in some cases
permanently. But this need not seem to have resulted in the permanent absence
of immigrant interests from any part of the public sphere.
C. Felon Semi-Citizenship and Representation
Levinson’s other example of a sizeable group that is counted by the state
but not included in the demos is felons.85 The semi-citizenship of felons differs
from that of children and most non-citizens. While children are persons on
their way to enfranchisement, and many non-citizens start out and remain
disenfranchised, felons were at one time enfranchised but they lose that right
upon their incarceration. Sometimes they regain that right and sometimes they
do not.86 Any adult offender incarcerated for a felony possessed a vote prior to
their first conviction. This difference creates a gulf between the trusteeship
models of representation on behalf of children, immigrants, and felons. Losing
one’s vote is a categorically different circumstance than someone who is on
track to become enfranchised but has not yet completed the track. In the
felon’s case, it leads to ask how someone previously considered competent to
vote and represent herself can be deemed incompetent to do so.
This question begs us to examine the basis for disenfranchisement. All
three groups under consideration are treated by the demos as either temporarily
or permanently “incapacit[ated],” to reintroduce Ian Shapiro’s justification for
the use of a fiduciary model of representation.87 Children’s developmental
immaturity is well documented,88 even if some children demonstrably
outperform their peers or even some adults in matters of political judgment. It
is not difficult to see why children are considered unfit to represent themselves.
Non-citizens are also treated as having untested loyalties, and it is a nearly
universal rule that foreign-born persons will have to endure a probationary

84. Testimony of Jose Antonio Vargas in Hearing on Comprehensive Immigration Reform
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 13, 2013), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.
gov/pdf/2-13-13VargasTestimony.pdf.
85. Levinson, supra note 4, at 950–51.
86. The Brennan Center tracks the voting rights of felons, ex-felons, parolees, and people on
probation at the state level. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 28.
87. SHAPIRO, supra note 73, at 70.
88. Andrew Rehfeld, The Child as Democratic Citizen, 633 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 141, 146 (2011).
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period before they are enfranchised.89 The probationary period is thought to
allow the development of ties and the acquisition of knowledge and norms
required for informed political participation.90 However, the least wellrepresented group of disenfranchised persons, felons and ex-felons, is
different. Children and non-citizens are developing political capabilities. We
do our best to ascertain when that threshold of capabilities has been reached,
and we judge it incrementally.91 A felony conviction is a breach of the social
contract. Crimes of moral turpitude therefore make a judgment about character
rather than capability, the trait to which Shapiro referred.
A character judgment departs from a capability judgment and necessarily
represents the most subjective and potentially fraught elements of the
democratic ethos. Recall Robert Dahl’s reluctance to introduce contingency to
questions of enfranchisement except in cases involving children, transients,
and the mentally unfit.92 Dahl resists a higher degree of contingency because
character judgments are highly vulnerable to the prejudices held by the demos.
Character judgments are often proxies for judgments that address neither
capability nor character.93
Returning to the question at hand: the conclusion that a felony conviction
voids someone’s capacity to make any political judgments is difficult to reach
and seems unrelated to the history of felon disenfranchisement. The most
detailed studies of the history of felon disenfranchisement in the United States
document that the practice gained initial momentum among states seeking to
counteract the enfranchisement of blacks following the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment.94 More recently, Michelle Alexander has illustrated
how post-Jim Crow drug criminalization and sentencing practices were part
and parcel of explicit attempts on the part of the Republican Party to politically
isolate and disempower black Americans.95 Felon disenfranchisement is
categorically different from the disenfranchisement of children and non89. The waiting period is so universal that it is one of the crucial measures integrated into
the Citizenship Policy Index used to evaluate how liberal or conservative a country’s immigration
policy is. MARC MORJÉ HOWARD, THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE 212 (2009).
90. See Elizabeth F. Cohen, Citizenship and the Law of Time in the United States, 8 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 53 (2013).
91. COHEN, supra note 1, at 206.
92. See DAHL, supra note 14, at 129.
93. Dahl makes this point in his discussion of the contingent principle. DAHL, supra note 14,
at 128. Alexander Keyssar mirrors this in the specific context of felon disenfranchisement.
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED STATES 163 (2000).
94. KEYSSAR, supra note 93, at 162.
95. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDESSS (rev. ed. 2012). Alexander discusses a number of facets of the Republican
strategy. Of particular relevance is the war on drugs perpetrated by the Reagan administration and
the federal intervention in local and state policing practices. Id. at 73.
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citizens. It has a long history of connection with racial discrimination in the
United States.
Mirroring the difference in the trajectory and basis of felon
disenfranchisement, the quality of political representation available to them is
markedly lower than that available to children and many non-citizens. By and
large, trusteeship fails as a model for the representation of felons. Mounting
evidence exists demonstrating that the disenfranchisement of felons has a
measurable and important effect on the outcome of elections at every level of
government.96 Furthermore, the experience of incarceration in the United
States has proven to be intractably inhumane. Recent protests and hunger
strikes have revealed the truly sordid conditions in which people incarcerated
in overcrowded prison systems such as California and Texas live.97 These
efforts at launching a social movement have by and large been declared a
failure.98 Similarly, Texas’s Maricopa County has gained national notoriety for
housing prisoners in “Tent City,” a site infamous for cruelly high temperatures
and otherwise inhumane conditions.99 While incarcerated, prisoners work for a
fraction of what their legal wages would be were they not incarcerated.100
The fact that felon disenfranchisement is not predicated on a
developmental discrepancy between felons and full citizens and the fact that
felon disenfranchisement has been directly linked to racially discriminatory
practices may explain why trusteeship on behalf of felons fails in comparison
to the trusteeship exercised on behalf of children. In this case,
disenfranchisement is neither protective nor probationary. Felon
disenfranchisement is intended not just to disenfranchise but also to reduce the
likelihood that the interests of black Americans will be represented. Based on
the findings of Uggen and Manza, it would appear that this effort has had at
least some success. Not only has a large and disproportionate subset of black
Americans been disenfranchised, but this disenfranchisement has altered
multiple electoral outcomes and affected the degree to which the interests of
black Americans, particularly those targeted by the criminal justice system, are

96. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? The Political Consequences
of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 786–90 (2002).
97. Paige St. John, Inmates End California Prison Hunger Strike, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 05,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/05/local/la-me-ff-prison-strike-20130906.
98. Id. The prisoners suspended their strike without state accession to any of their demands.
Id.
99. Tent City Jail, MARICOPA CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, http://www.mcso.org/JailInforma
tion/TentCity.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2014); James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, America’s 10
Worst Prisons: Tent City, MOTHER JONES (May 3, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.
com/politics/2013/05/10-worst-prisons-america-joe-arpaio-tent-city.
100. Section III: The Prison Economy, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, http://www.prisonpolicy.
org/prisonindex/prisonlabor.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2014).
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cared for in any capacity.101 During the period of time since the Voting Rights
Act came into effect, the number of black men that are incarcerated and the
length of time served has skyrocketed.102 It seems implausible to say that the
moral character of any social group has or could have plunged so rapidly
during this period. More likely, as Alexander persuasively demonstrates, it is
the case that the omnipresent resistance to adequately representing black
Americans has found a highly effective vehicle in felon disenfranchisement.
CONCLUSION: INEVITABILITY
Like all rights of citizenship, the political rights associated with
participatory democracy can be structured in more than one way and can be
parceled out to greater and lesser degrees. This creates semi-citizenships for
members of the population who have some but not all rights associated with
full citizenship. Semi-citizenship is inevitable because liberal democratic states
inevitably engender doctrinal conflict. That competition results in bargains
being struck in which citizenship rights are portioned out into different bundles
for different groups and individuals. Many of us hold forms of semi-citizenship
at one or another points in our lives.
Our political rights of franchise and representation exemplify this
phenomenon. Regardless of whether we think it just or unjust, liberal
democratic states disenfranchise some members in an attempt to reconcile
conflicting doctrines. This does not always mean that the disenfranchised are
unrepresented. Precisely because there is often as much doctrinal support for
including any given semi-citizen in the purview of the state as there is support
for excluding them, these disenfranchised groups are frequently represented in
the public sphere, sometimes in quite robust fashion. This can occur when
representatives serve as fiduciaries or trustees; Ian Shapiro’s definition of the
fiduciary was someone to whom we entrust the interests of a person who is
temporarily or permanently incapacitated. Semi-citizens are just such persons
and can in some cases be represented via trusteeship. In this sense, they are not
entirely different than people who vote for losing candidates and must rely on
someone for whom they did not vote for representation.
This Article does not argue in favor of abandoning the cause of
enfranchising semi-citizens who are capable of exercising franchise rights.
Quite the contrary: the most successful instances of trusteeship described in
this Article are those that move toward or end in the enfranchisement of
different semi-citizens. The argument of this Article is simply that trusteeship

101. Uggen & Manza, supra note 96, at 789.
102. The prison population of the United States rose every single year between 1978 and
2009. U.S. Prison Population Declined for Third Consecutive Year During 2012, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF J. (July 25, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/press/p12acpr.cfm.
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is an accepted and absolutely unavoidable means for ensuring that people who
are not full citizens still count in democratic politics—even when the demos is
less convinced of their equality than are either the state or liberal philosophy.
Exclusion, misrecognition, and disenfranchisement are inevitable. The work of
democracy is not limited to voting and delegating. It also requires that we
constantly scrutinize and contest the reasons and bases on which we exclude,
misrecognize, and disenfranchise. In so doing, the interests of the
disenfranchised will receive public attention. In the cases presented in this
Article, scrutiny yielded a marked distinction: groups for whom
disenfranchisement is a starting point in their political trajectories and for
whom disenfranchisement is based on a change in their capabilities are
distinguished from groups with ostensible moral failings mired in a history of
discrimination. In the latter case, we find a set of much more objectionable
practices than we do in either of the two former cases. Our work as citizens
and semi-citizens is then to figure out how to represent both our individual
selves and the interests of the groups, selves, and identities whose rights are
unjustifiably compromised.

